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EDWIN D.

DICKINSON

University of Michigan

On what conditions should the United States enter a world
organization for the maintenance of peace? Viewing the question broadly, should not the United States enter world organization upon one condition, namely, that the organization give
promise of the utmost achievement in the maintenance of peace?
Unless we are prepared to repudiate the avowals of our statesmen
and reverse what is perhaps the oldest and most fundamental
tradition of our foreign policy, can we consistently insist upon
any other condition than this one?
A good deal has been said of late about the "American idea"
in international relationships. It has been suggested that the
"American idea" was defined in Washington's farewell address,
in the Monroe Doctrine, or in America's participation in the
peace conferences held at The Hague. It seems evident, however, that this involves a confusion of the idea with its occasional
manifestation in action. If there is any one outstanding "American idea" which has inspired our foreign policy from the beginning-any quintessence of principle which may be derived alike
from the first neutrality proclamation, the farewell address,
Monroe's message, Hay's pronouncement for the open door, or
America's participation in the conferences at The Hague-that
idea is the maintenance of just and honorable peace.
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If peace has been our loadstar, expediency has been our guidepost. One hundred and twenty-five years ago, in the year of
Washington's farewell address, "our detached and distant situation" made a policy of aloofness the most effective way of maintaining peace in the western world. One hundred years ago,
when the political stage was being set for Monroe's epoch-making
message, the governmental systems prevailing elsewhere were
"essentially different

. . . . from that of America" and

any attempt to extend such systems to the western hemisphere
would have been "dangerous to our peace and safety." At the
end of the century, on the other hand, Secretary Hay found it the
part of wisdom to "act concurrently with the other powers" in
protecting interests and restoring peace in China. And only
recently "the utmost practicable coaperation in counsel and
action" with the states then at war with Germany was thought
necessary to "vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the
life of the world." While the aspiration for peace has been manifested in each great pronouncement, the measures taken have
been wisely determined by time and circumstance.
It seems a mere truism to say that time and circumstance are
now compelling us to place new emphasis upon the importance
of world organization. The world needs peace and security for
peace as the world has never needed it before. Nor is this a
circumstance which the United States can safely ignore. The
progress of events has been irresistibly "interweaving our destiny" with that of the rest of the world, so that the world's need
has become our need, and from motives generous or selfish, as you
please, we must view the problem very much as the rest of the
world is obliged to view it. In the light of these reflections,
should we not reformulate the question and inquire, What sort
of world organization promises most in security for peace?
There is at least one consideration which should never escape
us. The organization of the world which promises most in
security for peace will be neither the state of nature nor the superstate, neither Hell nor Utopia. If the idea of an international
state of nature was conceived as the beatification of chaos, it
has become in the modern world a monstrosity of the imagination.
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In the place of chaos there has evolved a vaguely defined and
somewhat protoplasmic organization of the international community. This must provide the essential groundwork. The
world organization of the future, far from resembling Utopia,
must consist of "a duller and heavier structure placed logically
upon the foundations of the existing system."
It is possible, of course, to build upon the existing foundations
and yet choose wisely or unwisely in planning the superstructure.
There are those who believe that we are confronted in this respect
with a choice of far-reaching import. It has been asserted that
the alternatives are an association of nations, on the one hand,
and a confederacy of nations on the other. It has been urged
that the idea of friendly and more or less informal association was
exemplified in the Pan-American conferences and the peace conferences at The Hague, while confederacy finds expression in the
League of Nations. I would like to submit, in the first place, that
these alternatives are by no means so sharply defined and
mutually exclusive as seems to have been assumed, and in the
second place, that in so far as they are mutually exclusive, there
should be no real doubt about the choice which the United States
is required to make.
The alternatives are neither well defined nor mutually exclusive. Consider the idea of association among nations as exemplified in the Hague peace conferences. Such conferences are interesting and important phenomena, but they are only a part of the
picture. Indeed, we have achieved much more in the way of
world organization than any study of such conferences can possibly disclose. The Hague conferences, for example, made no
contribution whatever to international administration and were
in no definite way associated with its development. And yet the
growth of administrative unions was undoubtedly one of the
most significant developments of the past half century. It is
noteworthy that the United States took an active and influential
part. Again, by way of providing for the peaceful settlement of
international disputes, the Hague conferences created the socalled Permanent Court of Arbitration. In the recent recrudescence of pessimism, this institution has come to be regarded in

186

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

some quarters as a unique expression in world organization of the
association idea. It seems to have been forgotten that in the
conferences which formulated the plan the principal merit claimed
for it was the superiority of something over nothing. Has it also
been forgotten that the best effort of the Second Hague Conference was spent upon an attempt to formulate a plan for a real
international court of justice and that this effort was initiated and
supported vigorously by the government of the United States?
It is well known that the effort failed because of inability to reach
an agreement upon the court's composition. It may be confidently asserted, nevertheless, that in preparing the way for future
agreement this abortive attempt was really the Second Conference's most substantial achievement. Finally, the Hague conferences afforded an opportunity for the friendly discussion and
adjustment of political questions. It is urged that we should
revive the conferences and perpetuate them. This is a proposition entitled to consideration on its merits. In the meantime,
however, it should be remembered that more was actually done
for the maintenance of peace in the past century by another type
of conference in which participation was more limited, procedure
less formal, and achievement more relevant to the world's immediate need. What survey of progress made in the development of world organization during the past century can neglect
the much maligned concert of the great powers, in which the
United States before the World War had begun to take an active
interest, with which it had on occasion consented to cooperate,
and which it has recently summoned to our own capital to consider certain of the more pressing international problems of the
present day. Let us complete the picture. Let us regard all
that the nations have achieved through generations of struggle
as a somewhat coherent though primitive organization. We see
a remarkable accumulation of administrative institutions which
has evolved more or less spontaneously to meet international
needs. We see fruitful experiments with arbitration, arbitration
dignified in the Hague Tribunal, and the foundations laid for an
international court of justice. We see international conferences
innumerable, including those which have been broadly represen-
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tative, and which have debated much but settled little, and also
those which have wielded power, though sometimes, it has
seemed, without much regard for justice. If we were to frame a
constitution for this complex organism, expressing accurately its
true significance, it is evident that the constitution would have
to provide for something much more substantial and complete
than intermittent and friendly association.
If those who urge the idea of association as opposed to confederacy really mean that we should revert to Hague arbitrations,
Hague conferences, and the like, instead of going ahead to build
more boldly upon existing foundations, there should be no uncertainty about the decision. The time has surely come when it
will be advantageous at least to co6rdinate the sprawling growth
of international administrative institutions under more systematic and centralized supervision. Nor is there any reason of expediency or principle why this should not be done. The time
has come also when the nations require an institution more
convenient, more permanent, more of the nature of a court than
the very imperfect contrivance devised at The Hague and known
as the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This so-called Permanent Court is not permanent. It is not a court. It provides only
a transitory forum which is too unwieldy and expensive for the
less important cases. It has no continuity, no history, no record
of past performance, and is too inconstant for many of the more
important cases. Leaving out of calculation the years of war,
the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration has decided an
average of less than one case a year. A few of its awards, as in
the Pious Fund or the Savarkar case, would have been creditable
to a court of justice. Others have presented the characteristics
of arbitration, notably the North Atlantic Fisheries award, giving
Great Britain two big fishes and the United States five little ones,
and the Casablanca award, deciding that whereas conflict results
from the collision of two incompatible forces the German consular
authorities in Morocco could not be blamed for a grave and manifest error. Let the system of arbitration be retained for the
settlement of controversies in which arbitration is appropriate.
But let us have also a court before which may be made a very
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humble and a very modest beginning in developing the processes
of international justice. Finally, has not the time arrived when
the United States ought to be more candid about its intention of
codperating, not only in regional conferences like the Pan-American, and general conferences like those held at The Hague, but
also in conferences like the one held recently at Washington
in which the great powers concert together. It is certain that the
United States will participate in many assemblies and councils of
both types. Experience has demonstrated that each has a useful
function to perform as a peace-promoting agency in international
affairs. Then why not be candid, in the interest of simplification
and certainty, and enter into an agreement with other nations for
the summoning periodically of conferences of either sort linked
together by the useful fiction of continuity. Why not take the
system of international conferences which has grown up in the
past and make it more efficacious by giving it a plan. If this is
the difference between association and confederacy, then why not
accept confederacy.
There are practical disadvantages, it must be admitted, in any
program which aims to create a more formal association or confederacy among nations. A program always excites quiescent
issues. Difficulties which time is competent to remove in an
evolutionary process become acute and sometimes insurmountable. Attrition is easier than the grand strategy.
As soon as it is proposed that nations organize their association
more systematically, serious difficulty is encountered in determining the measure of each nation's participation. How shall
we apportion representation in council, court, or conference?
How shall we distribute votes if there is to be voting, or expense
if there is to be a budget? There are great powers and small
powers, strong powers and weak powers, powers which are advanced in the civilization which is characteristic of the twentieth
century and others which are backward. The great powers will
not submit really important decisions to a tribunal or conference
which may be dominated by the small, weak, or backward states.
The lesser states know all too well the dangers which inhere in the
predominance of the great. Upon what basis is it possible to
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constitute an organization including sixty or more nations so as
to satisfy the powerful, safeguard the weak, assure adequate representation to every factor, and yet attain an organization which
is wieldy enough to serve some useful purpose in providing
security for peace?
The difficulty becomes more evident as we consider the extraordinary group of empires, nations, states, and quasi-states with
which we have to deal. There are between sixty and seventy
political entities in the world today (not including Andorra,
Lichtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino) which may fairly claim
some consideration in any program of world organization. These
entities divide the earth among themselves with little regard for
the cartographer's convenience. One is a mere pin point of
color. Another covers a great portion of the map with red or
brown or blue. Ten have a territorial area of upwards of a
million square miles, while twenty-eight reckon area in six
figures and twenty-nine reckon it in five figures. If territorial
area were to be accepted as a standard by which to measure the
right to participate in world organization, Japan might rank as
low as twenty-third or twenty-fourth, being outranked by such
countries as Abyssinia, Colombia, Persia, Peru, and Venezuela.
Diversities of population are quite as extraordinary as diversities
of area. The British Empire as a whole claims over 440 million.
China claims 400 million and probably has at least 325 million.
India claims more than 300 million. Including India as a separate entity, there are five countries which have a population well
over 100 million, while figures for the French empire fall but little
short of that number. On the other hand, seventeen countries,
not including the French colonial empire, compute population in
eight figures, twenty-eight compute it in seven figures, and ten
compute it in only six figures. Estimates of area and population
suggest only the more striking differences. There are maritime
states and inland states, states which are dependent upon overseas commerce and others which are nearly self-sufficient.
There are sea powers, land powers, and states of no military
power at all. There are states or quasi-states united loosely in
imperial union, and others which admit no ties except those of
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the great community. There are states which live in the penumbra of another's hegemony, and quasi-states under guarantee,
protection, or mandate. There are states-but why elucidate the
obvious? The problem of formulating a satisfactory scheme of
participation in world organization is one of unusual difficulty.
Experience indicates, nevertheless, that the problem may be
solved. There are several factors of which account will have to
be taken. Perhaps the most important of these factors is the distribution of the world's population. Prepossessed by tradition,
we have been inclined hitherto to make too much of the state, the
Great Leviathan, and not enough of humanity. We have been
unmindful at times of the principle that organization and law are
justified only as they promote the welfare of the human beings
whom they are intended to serve. International organization
and law must be justified by the same test. This means that
organization must in some degree represent and be responsive to
human beings who inhabit the earth. The practicability, the
necessity indeed, of taking this factor into account has been indicated in the spontaneous development of international conferences. While we have had regional conferences and general
conferences in which many states participated equally, really contentious issues have usually been referred to smaller conferences
in which the great powers were dominant. It is noteworthy that
the great powers today are included among the nine countries
which rank highest in population and that the other countries
included are China, India, Russia, and Germany. Population
is an important factor, but not the only one of which account
must be taken. A numerous people with an imperfectly developed economic or political organization cannot hope to exercise as much influence in world affairs as a less numerous but
more coherent people. Economic or political upheavals may
temporarily eclipse international power. It is apparent that we
must also give attention to what may be described, for want of
a better term, as qualitative criteria.
From brief suggestion of a feasible approach to principle, let
us turn to consider the principle's application in a plan. When
the time comes to draft a plan of organization, can we possibly
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do better than to make two series of conferences an outstanding
feature of the proposed organization? We may provide for
periodic conferences in which all nations participate equally and
also for conferences in which the nations greatest in population
and influence shall have a majority of the representation. We
may provide that these two series of conferences shall function
concurrently. The idea is an old one which has been urged
many times by illustrious advocates. It has been approved in
the recent treaties and embodied in the League of Nations.
More recently, the existence of such a twofold representation in
the league has made it possible, for the first time, to secure an
agreement among great states and small states on a plan for a
permanent international court of justice. As the brief history of
the Council and Assembly of the League has already demonstrated,
the bi-conference plan does not resolve all difficulties. But it
does provide a reasonable basis for compromise. It has a real
foundation in the experience of history. And by making it possible to organize the processes of peace it prepares the way for
more useful developments in the future.
Another difficulty results from the desire to invest world organization with power. It is said that international law must
have sanctions, that we must have an organization "with teeth."
This is an aspect of the quesion about which reasonable men may
disagree. It is my own opinion that we are in danger of confusing a vague ideal with the immediate opportunity. There is no
conceivable kind of world organization, with or without power,
which can certainly maintain peace. The German confederation
did not maintain peace among its members; neither did the federal
constitution of the United States; neither has British imperial
union. Who can view realistically this distrustful and distracted
world and hope that world organization may accomplish more?
Is there not grave danger, indeed, that world organization incorporating the sanctions of affirmative covenants, joint force, or
the boycott may cause more irritation than it allays and may
actually be provocative of war. This is the most serious defect
in the plan of the Paris treaties. Not content with negative
covenants and moral sanctions, the framers sought to include
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affirmative covenants and physical sanctions. And to cap the
climax of that scheme's iniquities, they compromised the whole
plan by linking it up with an impossible settlement, actually
giving the league more power to enforce the settlement than it
has to preserve peace. Disentangled from the European treaties
of peace, its covenants construed as self-denying and its guaranties as voluntary, the League of Nations presents an altogether
admirable scheme of organization. It is a great misfortune that
the United States has not found a way, safeguarded by adequate
reservations, to participate in its councils and in the new court of
justice which it has just created. We cannot hope to maintain
peace either with or without affirmative covenants and physical
sanctions, until the slow processes of evolution through education
have taught us to think and act differently in international relationships. The immediate opportunity is a more modest one.
By organization we may conserve what has already been achieved.
The importance of this is not always appreciated. We may also
equip ourselves much more effectively to meet current international needs. And, above all, we may direct and hasten the
processes of evolution by strengthening and improving the foundations upon which the superstructure of peace must eventually
repose.
It has been my purpose to suggest that world organization
ought to be grounded solidly upon the foundations laid in past
experience, that this has been satisfactorily achieved in the structure of the existing league, but that world organization for the
present should be without affirmative covenants or sanction of
physical force. Such a program is conservative. Is it worth
effort and sacrifice? It seems to me that it is not only worth
effort and sacrifice, but that it offers what is perhaps the greatest
opportunity for constructive achievement in international
affairs since the time of Grotius.
Consider the effect of such an organization upon the development of international law. It will be agreed, no doubt, that a
conspicuous imperfection in international law has been its unreality-the impractical and unsubstantial character of many of
its rules. This has been due largely to the circumstance that of
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all formulating agencies the juristic writings have been easily the
most influential. There has been nothing in international law
that is really comparable to the influence of judicial decisions,
administration, and legislation upon the growth of municipal law.
Modern developments in international organization have begun
to exert faintly an influence which is somewhat comparable. Is
it too much to hope that a program of world organization may
accelerate and strengthen this tendency and so make it possible
eventually to redeem the law of nations from its unreality.
It will be agreed also that another characteristic defect in
international law is its confusion at many points with the uncertainties and intrigues of diplomacy. How much depends, for
illustration, upon the anomalous rule in regard to recognition.
By withholding recognition a new community may be deprived,
with disastrous effect, of the status to which it ought to be entitled, or an old state may be partially outlawed by refusing to
recognize a change in government. And the decision or decisions
in each instance may be made in secret in the foreign offices of the
more influential powers. This, from the legal point of view, is an
abominable situation. With the nations organized, there need
be no justification for its continuance. In this and other respects
it may be possible through organization to develop clearer delimitations between the province of international law and the domain
of the diplomat. Finally, who would deny that the gravest of
all deficiencies in a very imperfect system has been the meager
development of peaceful remedial processes and the remarkable
emphasis placed upon war. World organization should change
the emphasis. Instead of peace conferences devoted to the laws
of war, we may hope for peace conferences concerned with the
laws and problems of peace. The way will be prepared for the
development of the most undeveloped and most important part
of the international system.
World organization promises no millennium, but it does promise new and greater opportunities for progress in the maintenance
of peace. By the fundamental traditions of its foreign policy and
by every consideration of self-interest, the United States is
required to take a helpful and an influential part.

